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Obama Administration Attempted to Learn 
from Failure of the Clinton Health Plan 
 In late 2010, as President Obama was bracing himself for the electoral back-
lash that loomed like a gathering storm among Americans unhappy with the 
passage of health-care reform and otherwise discomfited by the state of 
national aff airs, one source of consolation could be found in the thoughts of 
Tom Daschle, former Senate Majority Leader from South Dakota. In his book 
detailing the events leading up to the Democrats’ legislative breakthrough, 
Daschle recounted that as Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, he reportedly stated: “We have lost the South for a generation.” 1 With a 
little historical perspective, then, the Obama administration’s current plight 
seemed neither unique nor necessarily calamitous over the long term. 
 Daschle’s observation was not only perspicacious but also extremely apt 
in that a sense of historical awareness had suff used the administration’s 
health-reform effort from the outset. Throughout the months when the 
Obama team had developed an overhaul proposal and then fought for its 
adoption, avoiding damaging mistakes of the past approached the level of 
obsession. Th e push for health-care reform at times resembled nothing so 
much as an advanced policy seminar in which a bevy of experts, reform 
advocates, and other political commentators—from inside and outside 
 Th e authors are grateful to Christopher Bosso and Michael Dukakis of Northeastern 
University, as well as two anonymous reviewers of the  Journal of Policy History, for their 
comments on this article. 
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government—all weighed in with their advice (and personal reminiscences) 
about the missteps of 1993–94. In all, the lessons put forward were complex 
and multidimensional, encompassing policy design as well as political 
strategy, including the challenges of communication with an American public 
whose reactions could be crucial to the administration’s prospects for 
success. 
 Almost before the dust had settled once the Patient Protection and Aff ord-
able Care Act became law, a flurry of retrospectives attributed the success 
of President Obama and his political allies to their skillful reading of the 
historical record and heeding the guidance it provided. 2 Th is is “a story about 
political learning,” argued political scientist Jonathan Oberlander. “The 
Obama administration’s eff ort to pass reform in 2009–10 is best understood 
as a reaction to the Clinton administration’s health-care debacle during 1993–94. 
Th e Obama administration’s strategy was evidently to do the opposite of what 
the Clinton administration tried; the Clinton plan became a blueprint for 
what not to do in health reform.” 3 
 Th ere are three problems with this emerging body of literature and the 
conventional wisdom it threatens to establish. First, the contributors to this 
congratulatory commentary are, in many cases, the same individuals who 
earlier had shaped the political narrative about essential “lessons” of the Clinton 
Health Security Act. Th is group—prominent among them leading health 
policy academics—advanced its views not merely as scholars and analysts 
communicating about a fi eld of study, but also as enthusiasts for comprehen-
sive health reform who sought to use their writing to infl uence the policy 
process. David Blumenthal and James Morone stated in the preface to their 
ambitious and engaging work,  Th e Heart of Power: Health and Politics in the 
Oval Offi  ce : “Our fondest wish is that the lessons of this book will guide a 
new administration, however slightly, toward winning social justice and 
the people’s health.” 4 When authors who have proff ered historical advice later 
turn attention to assessing the impacts of action consistent with that advice, 
they are, in part, evaluating the wisdom of their own judgment and counsel. 
 Second, the subject of historical lesson drawing deserves more than a 
tallying of good and bad pieces of advice, however that appraisal might be 
done. Indeed, the process by which the “lessons of history” entered the warp 
and woof of health-reform discussion in 2009–10 is a striking development 
noteworthy in its own right, particularly for anyone curious about the trans-
mutation of “policy history” into a distinctive political discourse having 
observable potency. Th e question of who participated in this lesson-drawing 
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exercise about health reform and how key messages gained currency across 
various traditional and new media is neglected by recent authors focused on 
President Obama’s eff ective learning from past failure. Th is is unsurprising, 
given the largely self-referential nature of such a topic for this group. How-
ever, it highlights the need for a broader approach to lesson drawing that 
treats its forms and its methods of dissemination as signifi cant objects of 
inquiry. 
 Th ird, conclusions about the Obama administration’s adept use of histor-
ical lessons seem unduly infl uenced by the passage of health reform. Th at is, 
because the president implemented certain historical lessons in his line of 
attack regarding this political issue and later emerged from the legislative 
ordeal with a victory, the former is credited with producing the latter. 
Perhaps, but there is also the danger of a fallacy logicians call “affi  rming the 
consequent,” or “if A, then B; B, therefore A.” So it is that if one begins with 
the assumption that sound use of historical lessons was a prerequisite for the 
success of health reform in 2009–10, the ultimate success of health reform 
then demonstrates that historical lessons were soundly used. At the least, we 
hope to raise doubts about the benefi cial impact of several of the most ubiq-
uitous lessons derived from defeat of the Clinton health plan, lessons to which 
the Obama administration subscribed assiduously in its struggle to revamp 
the U.S. health-care system. 
 The potential contributions of historical insight to official decision 
making have been addressed by a number of historians and public policy 
specialists over the past four decades. A brief review of this concept of history 
as policy utility provides the necessary analytical backdrop for our consider-
ation of contemporary health reform as a case study in historical lesson 
drawing and its pitfalls. 
 on historical lessons and public policymaking 
 In a book dedicated to the uses of “historical thinking to imagine the future,” 
historian David Staley presents three broad views of the passage of time. 5 
A cyclical view conceives of the future “as fi xed and determined, and very 
similar to events that have occurred before.” 6 A linear view maintains that 
constant overarching forces produce a steady direction of change so that 
“events will not necessarily repeat themselves.” 7 Under the strongest versions 
of these cyclical and linear views, the movement of history can only be dis-
cerned; it cannot be changed. By contrast, a nondeterministic view holds that 
the future is “not so predetermined that humans could not exert some sort of 
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infl uence on the course of events, and in fact could construct for themselves 
their own future.” 8 With its emphasis on human agency, this approach treats 
historical insight as of more than merely intellectual interest, for it opens the 
door to leadership in carving out a path ahead. Th e future starts now with 
current plans and choices. 
 “Scenario thinking” is a principal method of analysis among those who 
believe in the feasibility of human beings shaping their own destiny and who 
are committed to consulting the historical record in order to forecast and 
create alternative futures. Th rough the adoption of systematic techniques of 
assessment combined with comprehensive consideration of factors from dif-
ferent realms, the outlining of plausible scenarios is, in the words of defense 
theorist Herman Kahn, a means of “disciplining the imagination.” 9 Although 
no one scenario may itself represent a confi dent prediction, this method 
promises to identify “a contingent future of many possibilities.” 10 And it is 
these contingencies that present the opportunity for strategy and manipulation. 
Staley summarizes: “Th e scenario method is based on evidence, is sensitive to 
context and contingency, is based on counterfactual thinking, sees the future 
as deterministic but not predictable, and is conveyed through narrative and 
stories.” 11 
 Although scenario writing can serve diverse ends—from abstract futur-
istic speculation, to war gaming, to practical business decision making—a 
specially prominent adaptation of the practice has emerged among those who 
would call upon the “lessons of history” to inform the public policy process. 
Straddling the spheres of scholarship and worldly engagement, these analysts 
belong fi rmly in the camp of those who hold faith in the past as at once an 
intelligible and usable resource, particularly when examined through the 
proper lens. Cast in this light, public policy becomes a potentially powerful 
form of historical action, one presumably under the control of public offi  cials 
and their advisers as they seek to steer the fi eld of events toward certain 
desired results and away from other outcomes either feared or rejected. 
 A concern with the lessons of history can be traced in the writing of great 
scholars and thinkers throughout the years, among them notables no less 
than Th ucydides, Santayana, and Durant. In the contemporary period, the 
work credited with helping to establish the fi eld of “applied history” while 
cultivating its relevance for the policy-making process is Ernest May’s classic, 
 “Lessons” of the Past . 12 To be sure, May expressed misgivings about simplistic 
analogies driven by superfi cial understanding of the historical process. Hence 
the quotation marks around the word “lessons” in his title. Published in the 
early 1970s, May’s book may be seen in part as a reaction against America’s 
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woeful Vietnam experience; he devoted an entire chapter to critiquing what 
he viewed as the misguided and counterproductive decision to bomb North 
Vietnam (even as he supported the logic of a  threat of bombing). More 
broadly, however, May assembled a series of case studies to illustrate the kind 
of sophisticated analytical approach by which offi  cials could “use history 
more discriminatingly. Th ey can seek alternative analogies and parallels and 
in doing so refl ect on whether a moral seen in one case is a principle exempli-
fi ed in many.” 13 
 May criticized fellow members of his profession for failing to help “people 
who govern” make proper use of the “enormously rich resource” of history. His 
position on the faculty of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment gave him an infl uential platform from which to advance this cause. 
Working with graduate students of public policy and management, May and 
his colleague Richard Neustadt, the eminent presidential historian, contrib-
uted to and oversaw the preparation of dozens of “teaching cases” designed to 
derive historical insights from an intensive review of concrete policy decisions 
ranging from issues of war and peace to bureaucratic management. Historians 
elsewhere soon picked up this same challenge. By 1981, the  New York Times 
heralded the emergence of a modest but thriving fi eld “that has grown up on 
the dual assertions that the lessons of history are relevant to the making of 
present-day social policy and that, as a result, historians ought to have a role 
in shaping policy.” 14 
 Neustadt and May’s  Th inking in Time , 15 published in 1986, went well 
beyond May’s opening salvo on this topic in regard to the scope of contempo-
rary examples selected for examination. As well, the book was much more 
explicit in its advice about the techniques policymakers could apply to mine 
the record of the past for present purposes. While eschewing any “capital-M 
methodology,” the authors nonetheless specifi ed “What to Do and How” 
when drawing on historical precedent, developing a series of action steps that 
may be summarized as follows: 16 
 •  Identify the nature of the problem to be solved. 
 •  Categorize factual elements concerning the current problem as 
Known, Unclear, and Presumed. 
 •  List any past situations considered to be potentially analogous to 
the current situation, with careful attention to both their likenesses 
and dissimilarities. 
 •  Defi ne the objective of current policy action based on a detailed 
“issue history” to clarify “the desired future.” 
 •  Select options for action that are in line with objectives and refl ect 
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awareness of what may have succeeded and what may have failed in 
the past, being mindful of the hazards of simplistic analogies. 
 •  Place into context the people and organizations whose support 
is crucial for successful implementation, paying special heed to 
relevant historical facts and details bearing on the capacity and/or 
disposition of these presumptive program elements. 
 No less pragmatic than the content of this well-honed set of instructions was 
its target audience: “We put our recommended steps in terms of staff  work, 
but our eyes are on the choices. If decision-makers are their own staff , or if 
staff ers make the choices, fi ne. Th e steps apply regardless.” 17 
 Th e history discipline’s concern with public policy formulation has been 
identifi ed in recent years as a prime force contributing to the “reconvergence 
of history and political science.” 18 Indeed, a focus on historical lessons fits 
quite comfortably into policy analysis models based on exhaustive informa-
tion gathering as a requirement for rational policymaking. 19 However, the 
most direct discussion within political science of the subject of historical 
lessons has come under the theoretical rubric of “policy learning,” the land-
mark contribution here belonging to British policy studies expert Richard 
Rose. 20 For Rose, lesson drawing is the predominant vehicle by which policy-
makers gain from experience across space and time. In both cases, the focus 
is much the same—to search for examples of what ought and ought not to be 
done in the future based on “understanding under what circumstances and to 
what extent programs eff ective elsewhere will work here.” 21 No matter whether 
the object of scrutiny is found abroad or within one’s own institutions earlier 
in time, Rose asserts that “a lesson is . . . a political moral drawn from analys-
ing the actions of other governments.” 22 
 In the spirit of Neustadt and May, to whom he is intellectually indebted, 
Rose aims to separate lessons from full-blown analogies, since “lessons must 
identify circumstances that are diff erent as well as those that are the same, 
whereas an analogy between the present and past assumes that the similarities 
justifying the analogy are suffi  ciently powerful to off set all diff erences.” 23 His 
goal is a perspective linking diff erent types of policy change to the nature of 
continuities/discontinuities within a policy fi eld. 24 An extensive, if informal, 
network of knowledge specialists from universities, government, and the 
private sector puts forward the ideas that attract consideration in lesson drawing. 
Th ese actors constitute what Rose terms “epistemic communities.” 25 Finally, 
although Rose is chiefl y interested in the performance of operating programs 
as the “unit of analysis,” his framework necessarily embraces politics as a 
salient dimension in calculations of “political feasibility” that can distinguish 
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“practicality from desirability” in the evaluation of new programs. Th is search 
for a rigorous social science approach to historical understanding may be 
seen as a precursor to the current “historical turn in the policy sciences,” 26 
including the work of Pierson with its interest in unpacking sophisticated 
temporal concepts such as path dependence, threshold models, and critical 
junctures. 27 
 None of this is to say that historians, even those most engaged in public 
affairs, do not retain ambivalence about turning their scholarly craft to 
applied uses. In one of his fi nal works, the late Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who was 
a speechwriter and special assistant for John F. Kennedy, referred to the 
“inscrutability of history” while warning that “far from offering a short-
cut to clairvoyance, history teaches us that the future is full of surprises and 
outwits all our certitudes.” 28 Yet, to the extent that “historical consciousness” is 
intrinsic to individuals and to cultures, 29 government offi  cials have always 
been influenced by past events, however unrefl ectively at times. Indeed, no 
advocate of lesson drawing would claim to be suggesting an enterprise not 
already widely in practice. As Otis Graham has put it, “Th us it is much too 
late to debate whether history should serve power. Power answered that 
question a long time ago.” 30 Rather, the intellectual movement surveyed here 
has simply added impetus to a basic instinct while encouraging its expression 
as a more explicit and systematic part of the policy-making endeavor. At a 
later point in this article, important assumptions and claims of this perspec-
tive will need to be revisited. Next, however, we examine the phenomenon 
of historical lesson drawing in the great health-care-reform debate of 
2009–10. 
 drawing lessons from the clinton health reform 
 Th e Kennedy School’s model of staff  advisory seems a tame aff air when set 
alongside the highly visible and vigorous discourse marking attempts to school 
the Obama administration on lessons of the Clinton health plan. Th e many 
venues in which this conversation played out included academic and profes-
sional circles, offi  cial and unoffi  cial briefi ngs, public aff airs magazines, news-
paper columns, cable television, the world wide web, and the blogosphere. 
Scholars, former and current public policymakers, elected offi  cials, journal-
ists, and pundits all were involved, with some individuals playing more than 
a single role from the list. Perhaps never before has such a diverse and, at 
times, impassioned group—a kind of “epistemic community” on steroids—
taken form to supply historical perspective on a public policy issue. 
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 Small wonder that so much attention was paid to the Clinton debacle. 
Despite a long line of presidents who had tried and failed to achieve health-
care reform, no previous eff ort was as dramatic or politically momentous as 
the rise and demise of President Clinton’s proposal. Th e episode began when 
Bill Clinton was elected in 1992, in part on the promise of fi xing a “broken” 
health-care system. Eight months aft er entering offi  ce, the president delivered 
a well-received speech before Congress in which he famously promised to 
deliver “health security . . . that can never be taken away.” 31 He also appointed 
his wife Hillary to the Task Force on National Health Reform, a bold move 
signaling that this issue was of the highest personal, as well as political, 
importance. This commitment, combined with Democratic dominance of 
both legislative houses, led many political observers to predict that Clinton 
would fi nally do the impossible—overhaul the nation’s health-care system. 
 It soon became clear, however, that the task of draft ing comprehensive 
health-care legislation was going to be far more time consuming than esti-
mated. A protracted and secretive process of policy development, combined 
with the issue’s sheer complexity, invited harsh and seemingly relentless 
attacks from opponents once the Clinton proposal was announced. Public 
opinion, initially supportive of the president, turned negative, and the air of 
inevitability dissolved. Within less than a year, Clinton’s much-heralded cru-
sade for health reform died without his plan ever making it to the fl oor of the 
U.S. Congress for a vote. 
 What went wrong with the Clinton health plan? Early postmortems by 
students of health policy and American politics predated Barack Obama’s 
arrival on the Washington scene as senator, much less president, by many 
years. Nonetheless, they formed the bedrock of lessons that would continue 
to echo when the nation resumed the unfi nished business of health reform. 
 Perhaps the most common thread running through this post-defeat 
analysis was that the Clinton administration had focused so intently on fash-
ioning an ideal policy that it overlooked a strategy for selling the product. 
Jacob Hacker, who wrote a detailed account of the intellectual genesis of 
the Clinton plan, made this point explicitly, arguing that “the White House 
did not just bungle the politics—it failed to take any real action to speak of.” 32 
According to Hacker, failure to recognize the political dimension of health-
care reform was not just a minor oversight. Rather, the “fundamental problem 
with the White House eff ort” was the very “conception of politics on which 
their reform strategy was based.” 33 Instead of taking into account what 
was doable, the administration had employed a purely “policy-analytic method-
ology” preventing “full realization of the political, institutional, and cultural 
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context in which policy ideas must be justified, debated, enacted, and 
implemented.” 34 
 Th e administration’s hypertechnical approach drew another criticism as 
well. Haynes Johnson and David Broder, two well-respected newspaper 
reporters who combined eff orts on a scholarly examination of the Clinton 
reform, noted that such terms as “alliances,” “managed competition,” “mandates,” 
and “cooperatives” had proved incomprehensible as well as alienating. Such 
jargon “sounded heavy, bureaucratic, authoritarian” and was “neither simple 
nor reassuring” to an increasingly skeptical American public. 35 As a result, 
opponents found it easy to portray the Clinton proposal as overwrought with 
operational layering and complexity, a kind of Frankenstein’s monster of big 
government. Th us, a key lesson taken from the Clinton experience was that 
deliberate and eff ective use of language is essential when it comes to selling 
health reform and defending it against detractors. 
 Harvard political scientist Theda Skocpol contended that the 1994 
“Republican Revolution,” which swept away Democratic majorities in the 
House and Senate, was at least partly due to the president’s inability to fulfi ll 
promises on health care. Writing in 1995, Skocpol observed that the “collapse 
of the 1993–1994 campaign for health-care reform lurked in the electoral 
upheavals of November 1994.” 36 Th is analysis off ered a distinct lesson learned 
and an implicit warning about the high political price for future failure on 
this issue. 
 Paul Starr is a distinguished sociologist and historian of American medical 
care who served as a senior health policy adviser under Clinton. Writing 
close on the heels of reform’s untimely end in 1994, Starr pointed to poor 
strategic judgment as a primary reason why the administration’s health proposal 
never gained traction. Recognizing that many important groups had thought 
twice about supporting Clinton’s proposal, he explained: “Because we had 
failed to edit the plan down to its essentials and fi nd familiar ways to convey 
it, many people couldn’t understand what we were proposing. Th ere were too 
many parts, too many new ideas, even for many policy experts to keep 
straight.” Going further, Starr off ered the following metaphor: “Th e adminis-
tration had gone to the trouble of writing a bill and then left  it like a foundling 
on the doorstep of Congress.” 37 Th is rather sad image of health-reform legislation 
as a bereft  child adds weight to the lesson conveyed by Hacker and others that 
the administration failed to match the energy it poured into policy formulation 
with a similar political exertion. Starr also underscored that the nation 
needed a more expeditious and incremental tack on health-care reform: “Th e 
lesson for next time in health reform is faster, smaller. We made the error of 
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trying to do too much at once, took too long, and ended up achieving 
nothing.” 38 
 Fast forward to 2007 and Jonathan Oberlander, prominent member 
of a younger generation of health policy scholars, was even more interested 
in looking ahead than licking past wounds. He published an article in the 
 New England Journal of Medicine , the nation’s premiere professional medical 
journal, accusing the Clinton administration of “excessive ambition.” Specifi cally, 
the administration’s “plan attempted simultaneously to secure universal 
coverage, regulate the private insurance market, change health-care fi nancing 
through an employer mandate, control costs to levels enforced by a national 
health board, and transform the delivery system through managed care.” 39 
Given that any one of these goals represented a major political challenge, the 
attempt to do all in one shot “galvanized opposition.” For Oberlander, the 
Clinton “misadventure” provided invaluable political lessons: fi rst, no matter 
how much momentum health reform may possess, the political system will 
be deeply resistant to change; second, many Americans are content with their 
health-care arrangements and will be prone to view change as a threat; third, 
no universal health-care plan can avoid a divisive ideological debate; fourth, 
fi nding a viable method of paying for health-care reform remains a riddle; 
fi ft h, the power of the president to force policy change will always be limited 
by the institutional framework of American government; and fi nally, since 
the window of opportunity for enacting comprehensive reform never stays 
open for long, failure carries the penalty of pushing needed change well into 
the future. 40 Oberlander’s enumeration approach to conveying lessons from 
the Clinton failure was not uncommon in literature on this subject. Its eff ect 
was to give the impression of an established catalogue of strategic insights in 
which any serious health policy scholar or reformer should be well versed. 
 Published in the infl uential journal  Health Aff airs around the time Barack 
Obama locked up the Democratic nomination, Joseph Antos’s article, “Lessons 
from the Clinton Plan,” presumed to off er the next president “a few suggestions.” 41 
Th e fi rst was to avoid making the assumption that simply winning the presi-
dential election would constitute a policy mandate. Antos recalled that Clinton 
had entered offi  ce with “strong public credibility on health care and a Demo-
cratically controlled Congress,” and still failed to garner adequate political 
support for reform. Second, Antos cautioned the next president to “be wary 
of insurance mandates” and overregulation, in general, in addressing gaps in 
insurance coverage and spending growth. For, despite what the Clinton team 
had surmised, such policies are “unlikely to work as they are intended to.” 42 
Antos favored a distinctly “American solution” incorporating what could be 
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learned not only from the Clinton failure but also from the wide range of 
health policy changes implemented by states during subsequent years. 
 In 2009, David Blumenthal, a physician and former Clinton adviser, and 
James Morone, a political scientist, published the book  Th e Heart of Power , 43 
which chronicled how the White House since FDR has dealt with health 
policy challenges and political confl icts. In addition to providing a behind-
the-scenes look at how a series of eleven chief executives worked at enacting 
signature health-care reforms, including an examination of the infl uence of 
presidential illnesses and health orientations, Blumenthal and Morone drew 
lessons from this record of successes and failures. Th eir list of “eight rules” is 
largely consistent with scholarship focusing on the Clinton administration, 
including the need to act quickly, eff ectively manage Congress, and actively 
create popular support. For Blumenthal and Morone, presidential passion is 
perhaps the most important ingredient in the formula for success. Guarding 
against overoptimism on the verge of Obama’s turn at the helm, they also 
stressed that a president should have the ability to frame a loss in terms 
helpful for future reform eff orts. Former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich 
reviewed  Th e Heart of Power for the Sunday  New York Times Book Review . 
Finding it “timely and insightful,” Reich wrote approvingly that “the lesson 
that one will probably take away . . . is that a president must set broad health-
reform goals and allow legislators to fi ll in the details, but be ready to knock 
heads together to forge a consensus.” 44 
 Th is cumulating scholarly didactic served two broad functions. First, it 
established a compendium of analysis and guidelines helping politicians, 
political commentators, and advocates to appreciate the intricate pathways of 
health-care reform. Second, this body of work reinforced the commonsense 
perception that a resounding legislative defeat such as Clinton had suff ered 
must hold a wealth of practical knowledge pertinent for achieving future 
success. During the heated 2008 presidential primaries, which were oft en 
dominated by the topic of health care, Ezra Klein, a staff  reporter and blogger 
for the  Washington Post as well as a  Newsweek columnist, asserted that “today’s 
reformers have one thing that yesterday’s didn’t: Th e lessons of 1994.” 45 
Drawing on the likes of Jacob Hacker and David Broder, Klein laid out three 
reasons why “the Clinton administration’s health-care reform eff ort failed, 
and how the next Democratic president can get it right.” First, Clinton failed 
to harness the benefi ts of his postinauguration honeymoon, allowing political 
gridlock to set in; second, because the reform process took place behind 
closed doors and outside the halls of Congress, the plan was not politically 
viable; and third, the administration neglected to build a coalition supportive 
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of its proposal, even among traditional Democratic allies. Once Obama won 
the general election and another health-reform eff ort became imminent, 
Klein’s lessons and others very similar dotted the mainstream media, taking 
on the aura of established political lore. Klein became a regular guest on such 
liberal cable shows as “Countdown with Keith Olbermann,” “The Rachel 
Maddow Show,” “Hardball with Chris Matthews,” and “Th e Daily Show,” which 
amplifi ed the reach of his ideas. 
 Of course, not all political pundits were interested in facilitating the 
passage of health-reform legislation. It should be noted that conservatives 
used Clinton’s defeat to inform their opposition to Obama. William Kristol, 
a well-known conservative commentator, gave Republicans the following advice 
when it looked like they were gaining the upper hand against the administration 
in the fall of 2009: “With Obamacare on the ropes, there will be a temptation 
for opponents to let up on their criticism, and to try to appear constructive, 
or at least responsible. . . . My advice, for what it’s worth: Resist the tempta-
tion. Th is is no time to pull punches. Go for the kill.” 46 Th ese words recalled 
an infamous 1993 political memo to the Republican leadership in which Kristol 
had warned: “Any Republican urge to negotiate a ‘least bad’ compromise with 
the Democrats, and thereby gain momentary public credit for helping the 
president ‘do something’ about health care, should . . . be resisted.” 47 In the 
eyes of reform opponents, then, the Clinton episode off ered a serviceable set 
of lessons in how to obstruct. Even the term “Obamacare” was a re-creation 
of “Hillarycare,” chosen for calculated effect in disparaging the president’s 
plan while linking it to Clinton’s failure. 
 Central to the dynamic process by which lessons of the Clinton episode 
attained the status of conventional political wisdom was the blurring of lines 
between scholarship and political punditry. Not only did scholarly literature 
underpin the views of Klein and others, academics themselves played polit-
ical pundit on this topic. Jacob Hacker, noted earlier for his learned analysis 
of the demise of the Clinton plan, found the blog space of  Th e New Republic 
an apt place to disseminate “four big recommendations” for how the Obama 
administration should proceed politically. 48 Hacker’s recommendations, 
repetitive of his own previous statements and the ideas of others, under-
scored the extent to which elite and more mainstream commentary blended 
together. 
 Similarly, back in the fray as co-editor of  The American Prospect , Paul 
Starr wrote pieces giving strategic advice to contemporary advocates of 
reform. In an item titled “Sacrifi cing the Public Option,” Starr urged progres-
sives to “chill out” and allow the public option to be jettisoned if political 
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backing failed to materialize. Starr’s underlying logic betrayed his own painful 
experience in the Clinton administration. He argued that if Democratic 
lawmakers failed to vote for reform simply because it lacked a public option, 
“they will help to ruin the best chance in years to put health care on a path 
toward reform. And they will do severe damage to the presidency of Barack 
Obama.” 49 
 Stanley Greenberg, a political pollster who had worked for President 
Clinton, collected fresh polling results to assess the prospects for health 
reform in 2009. His reaction was foreboding: “Oh no. It can’t be. Nothing’s 
changed.” 50 In a widely referenced article, Greenberg warned contemporary 
reformers that although “the country proclaimed its readiness for bold reform,” 
there are “eerily parallel numbers” to 1993–94 capable of undercutting 
momentum toward reform, including three-quarters of Americans who “are 
satisfi ed with their own health insurance.” Th e underlying message? “Obama 
might want to pay attention to how closely his situation echoes Clinton’s.” 51 
National Public Radio took interest in Greenberg’s analysis, following up 
with an interview in which the pollster articulated this major lesson based on 
experience: Th e president must be a “teacher,” who explains to the public both 
the “macro” questions of health reform on the system level and the “micro” 
questions of how the details will aff ect them as individuals. 52 
 Tom Daschle, former Senate Majority Leader, was another veteran of the 
melee of 1993–94, who authored a book titled  Critical that amounted to a 
“virtual road map . . . to avoid the pitfalls that doomed Clinton’s effort.” 53 
A chief lesson for Daschle was that “the [Clinton] White House should have 
engaged congressional leaders in a more meaningful way at the very beginning, 
on both the substance of the bill and the strategy for passing it.” 54 Daschle 
urged future reformers to go “on the off ensive,” citing the danger of letting the 
next “Harry and Louise” ad defi ne the terms of the debate. And he stressed 
the need to “educate the people on the emptiness of antireform rhetoric.” 55 
President Obama liked Daschle’s views well enough to nominate him to head 
both the Department of Health and Human Services (DHS) and a new White 
House Offi  ce of Health Reform, although Daschle later had to withdraw due 
to a tax snafu. 
 Yet no political veteran of the early 1990s could speak more directly or 
more intimately of the lessons of the Clinton administration than Bill Clinton 
himself, who gave an interview with  Esquire magazine in early 2009. Clinton 
claimed provocatively, “Almost everything anyone today writes about this 
stuff is wrong.” 56 The former president stated that it was congressional 
Democrats who required his administration to take charge of health reform, 
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and he off ered a simple reason for his failure to secure legislation: “We just 
couldn’t do it as long as Bob Dole was running for president.” As Clinton 
explained, the Senate Minority Leader would not cooperate due to his fear 
that a Clinton victory on health care would thwart his presidential aspira-
tions. Whatever one makes of this narrow partisan account of events, Clinton 
did line up with others in directing attention to lessons of the past: “What I’m 
more worried about is our people getting careless, forgetting the experience 
of ’94, and that it is imperative that they produce a health-care bill for the 
president and make it the best one they can; if it’s not perfect we’ll go back and 
fi x it. . . . Th e people hire you to deliver.” It is not known the extent to which 
the current and ex-president consulted privately on the matter of health-care 
reform, although White House Chief of Staff  Rahm Emanuel did coordinate 
a visit by Bill Clinton with Senate Democrats at their weekly conference lunch 
on November 10, 2009. Aft er discussing similarities and diff erences between 
1993 and 2009 in the closed-door meeting, “Clinton told reporters he urged 
Democrats to compromise when necessary, but to move a bill quickly.” 57 
 how the obama administration applied its lessons 
 Th e chorus of lessons vocalized by this far-fl ung epistemic community did 
not fall on deaf ears. To the contrary, the health-reform approach adopted by 
the Obama administration sought to avoid mistakes of the Clinton era in 
ways both specifi c and obvious. It is useful to organize this analysis according 
to three broad categories: political tactics, policy design, and rhetorical 
message. 
 Just six weeks into his presidency, on March 5, Barack Obama launched 
his reform initiative with a highly publicized “health-care summit.” Invited 
were representatives of the insurance industry, hospital executives, doctors, 
nurses, patients, business and labor leaders, and other key stakeholders. 
According to the president, the purpose of the summit was to begin discussion 
about how best to “lower costs for everyone, improve quality for everyone, 
and expand coverage to all Americans.” Setting the tenor of the event, the 
president also told his audience: “Each of us must accept that none of us 
will get everything we want, and that no proposal for reform will be perfect.” 
Furthermore, “While everyone has a right to take part in this discussion, no 
one has the right to take it over and dominate.” 58 One in attendance was 
Bill Gradison, former head of the Health Insurance Association of America, 
the group that had funded the “Harry and Louise” ads against the Clinton 
plan. Commented Gradison: “My impression is that there’s been a real openness 
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to reach out to diverse interests, not leaving anyone out—which is how a lot 
of people felt back in the 1990s. . . . Th ey seem to have learned the lessons of 
what not to do this time.” 59 Chip Kahn, president of the American Federation 
of Hospitals, which also had fought President Clinton’s plan, said: “Th is is a 
diff erent day . . . I think among most of the stakeholders, everyone wants to 
see this work. Th ere is a tremendous feeling that it’s time.” 60 All things consid-
ered, Chief of Staff  Emanuel may be forgiven a certain boastfulness in his 
upbeat take on the administration’s strategy as “the manifestation of a series 
of learned examples, learned lessons.” 61 
 Bipartisanship figured centrally in administration plans for achieving 
reform. According to reporters from the  Washington Post , the president and 
Emanuel “understood that most Republicans would oppose them. But in 
the upbeat early days of the administration, they thought some amount of 
bipartisanship was possible. (At the time, it was also a necessity; Democrats 
did not have 60 reliable votes in the Senate to overcome fi libusters.)” 62 Th e list 
of invited guests at the March summit included roughly one hundred members 
of Congress, most of them Democrats. Yet a number of Republican leaders 
were also there, including David Camp, top Republican on the House Ways 
and Means Committee, Charles Grassley, senior Republican member of the 
Senate Finance Committee, and Senator Judd Gregg, who was briefl y President 
Obama’s choice for Commerce Secretary. One breakout session put Democrats 
and Republicans together to confer on the possibility of a bipartisan bill. 63 
Just one month aft er the health-care summit, the president invited GOP 
leaders to the White House for a face-to-face discussion on health care. Th ere 
was also hope that Democrats and Republicans would close ranks, at least to 
some extent, within the congressional committee process. In January 2010, 
Obama acknowledged the “sour climate on Capitol Hill” and tried to push for 
cooperation between the parties by attending a House Republican health-
care retreat. He off ered an olive branch and, in conciliatory fashion, admitted 
some personal culpability: “What I can do maybe to help is to try to bring 
Republican and Democratic leadership together on a more regular basis with 
me. Th at’s I think a failure on my part.” 64 One month later, almost exactly one 
year after the initial health-reform summit, Obama convened yet another 
“bipartisan health-care summit” at Blair House, the official presidential 
guesthouse. During this unprecedented event, the president moderated 
an exchange of ideas from both sides of the aisle over a period lasting nearly 
seven hours. 
 Th e president had set an ambitious August deadline for Congress to send 
a completed bill to his desk. Here was a sign that Obama accepted another 
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prevailing lesson from the Clinton years, namely, that the previous adminis-
tration did not capitalize on its postelection window of opportunity. Resolving to 
avoid this same mistake, President Obama and his advisers conveyed a 
palpable sense of urgency on health reform beginning in early 2009, this 
despite the nation’s still-fl oundering economy. Meeting with Senate Democrats 
in early June, the president communicated an almost anxious impatience to 
make haste: “So we can’t aff ord to put this off , and the dedicated public servants 
who are gathered here today understand that and they are ready to get going, 
and this window between now and the August recess I think is going to be 
the make-or-break period. This is the time where we’ve got to get this 
running.” 65 
 At the outset, President Obama decided that, as Daschle and others had 
advised, Congress should take the lead in writing health-reform legislation. 
Employing a strategy sharply diff erent from the Clinton administration, 
which had sidelined lawmakers in policy development, Obama encouraged 
Congress to follow a “set of eight principles” off ering only basic guidance on 
the nitty-gritty issues pivotal to reform. Obama’s guiding principles were: 
(1) guarantee choice, (2) make health coverage aff ordable, (3) protect families’ 
fi nancial health, (4) invest in prevention and wellness, (5) provide portability 
of coverage, (6) aim for universality, (7) improve patient safety and quality 
care, and (8) maintain long-term fi scal sustainability. 66 Nancy Pelosi, Speaker 
of the House, acknowledged the president’s broad guidance, as well as his 
hands-off  style of leadership, during a rally in the fall of 2009, in which she 
thanked the president for his “intellectual contributions” to the bill being 
craft ed by her and her colleagues. 67 So yielding and distant was the president 
during this period that he attracted criticism from certain Democrats in 
Congress—notably, the single-payer advocates—who desired his help in 
pushing for stronger legislation. 
 Yet the president remained steadfast in resisting any temptation for the 
executive branch to micromanage health-care reform this time around, all of 
which stands in stark contrast with President Clinton’s strong-arm treatment 
of Congress in 1993–94. Ultimately, President Obama did release his own 
blueprint for reform, but it was not until late February 2010 when the legisla-
tive process tottered on the brink of collapse. Observed the  New York Times : 
“Th e release of the bill is an extraordinary reversal for a president who has 
long said he would leave legislating to the legislators.” 68 In fact, however, the 
administration hewed closely to the measure already passed by the Senate. 
 Both in terms of early principles and later specifi cs, the administration 
formulated a policy whose design refl ected other lessons taken from previous 
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failure. As noted, the Clinton plan, while built on existing institutional struc-
tures, had called for dramatic all-in-one change of American health care. 
Obama’s approach to health reform was, by comparison, much more incre-
mental and limited. Th e president never insisted on universal coverage, as 
Clinton had done. Nor did he choose to pursue tough cost-containment 
measures. Under his plan, Medicare and Medicaid would continue, for the 
most part, in current form. And although the president spoke on behalf of 
including a “Public Coverage Option” as part of his new Health Insurance 
Exchanges, this was never made a drop-dead condition for reform. 
 Soon aft er he entered the White House, President Obama was also advo-
cating for an “individual mandate.” According to this provision, individuals 
not receiving coverage from another source would have to purchase health 
insurance directly or pay a penalty through the tax code. During the 2008 
primary campaign, Obama had routinely attacked Hillary Clinton for putting 
forward just this idea. Yet Mrs. Clinton had deep political scars from her own 
foray into the politics of heath care during the early 1990s, and she needed to 
promise voters something other than the “big government” solutions with 
which she became identifi ed as First Lady. President Obama’s acceptance of 
an individual mandate showed that he had come to believe, with Hillary, in 
the political pragmatism of accenting a measure of individual responsibility 
within health reform. Moreover, an individual mandate had been central to 
the bipartisan universal health-care package adopted in Massachusetts in 
2006, under Republican governor Mitt Romney. 
 Still another reason argued on behalf of an individual mandate. Rather 
than confront health insurers head-on, as Bill Clinton had done, President 
Obama sought to co-opt them by cutting a deal with the powerful industry 
group, America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP). In return for Obama’s 
acceptance of an individual mandate, which promised to deliver millions of 
new paying customers to the insurance companies, AHIP would consent to a 
ban on the practice of excluding subscribers due to preexisting conditions. 
AHIP’s fondness for this deal was no surprise. As early as November 2008, 
the group called publicly for a reform plan that would include “guarantee-
issue coverage with no pre-existing condition exclusions” in combination 
with “an individual coverage requirement.” 69 Wary of revitalizing destructive 
political confl icts of the past, the Obama administration gave the industry 
what it wanted. 
 With regard to the rhetoric of reform, this gentleman’s agreement led 
the Obama team to refrain from portraying the health insurance industry 
in a negative light, at least for a while. The goal was to avoid the war of 
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words—and ad spots—with insurers and other well-fi nanced interests that 
had buried the Clinton plan. Although this strategy was never made explicit 
by the Obama administration, when asked during a town-hall meeting in 
Montana why it was that he “decided to vilify health insurance companies,” 
Obama’s response was revealing:
 First of all, you are absolutely right that the insurance companies, in 
some cases, have been constructive. So I’ll give you a particular 
example. Aetna has been trying to work with us in dealing with 
some of this preexisting conditions stuff . . . . And there are other 
companies who have done the same. . . . So my intent is not to vilify 
insurance companies. If I was vilifying them, what we would be 
doing would be to say that private insurance has no place in the 
health-care market, and some people believe that. I don’t believe 
that. What I’ve said is let’s work with the existing system. 70 
 Th is reluctance by the president to single out health insurers as adversaries 
held fi rm until late in the reform campaign. 
 Yet President Obama and his advisers did understand the price paid by 
the Clinton administration for failing to respond quickly to opposition 
attacks. Th e decision was made to launch a web page, “Health Insurance 
Reform: Reality Check,” linked to  www . whitehouse . gov , for the purpose of 
refuting criticisms of the president’s initiative. 71 David Axelrod, senior adviser to 
the president, showed a particularly keen appreciation for the importance of 
“messaging.” Immediately following a presentation to House Republicans 
by consultant Frank Luntz, in which the conservative wordsmith outlined 
eff ective lines of attack against the Democratic health plan, Axelrod visited 
Capitol Hill to “help hone talking points” with congressional Democrats. 72 
Later, Senator Evan Bayh explained why this event was necessary: “I think 
there was some unease that we didn’t have a strategy. [Axelrod] was coming 
up to reassure the Senate that they do have a strategy.” Senate Majority Whip 
Richard Durbin added: “Th is is an eff ort to coordinate our message so we 
present a health-care reform eff ort the American people trust.” 73 
 Defi ning the benefi ciaries of reform was another area of public rhetoric 
in which President Obama was determined to improve on 1993–94. Whereas 
Clinton had tended to focus on the uninsured, Obama spoke insistently about 
reducing and lowering costs for those already with insurance. 74 Obama also 
tried to calm gnawing apprehensions about unwanted change among those 
satisfi ed with their health coverage, a bloc identifi ed by Greenberg and others 
as crucial to winning the hearts and minds of the general citizenry. Consider 
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the following sales pitch delivered by the president before the annual meeting 
of the American Medical Association in June:
 I know that there are millions of Americans who are content with 
their health care coverage—they like their plan and, most impor-
tantly, they value their relationship with their doctor. Th ey trust you. 
And that means that no matter how we reform health care, we will 
keep this promise to the American people: If you like your doctor, 
you will be able to keep your doctor, period. If you like your health 
care plan, you’ll be able to keep your health care plan, period. No 
one will take it away, no matter what. My view is that health care 
reform should be guided by a simple principle: Fix what’s broken 
and build on what works. And that’s what we intend to do. 75 
 For the Obama administration, one logical way of persuading those with 
coverage about the need for reform was to highlight America’s “underinsured.” 
“Underinsurance” is a term used to describe those who have health insurance, 
but with gaps that lead to high out-of-pocket health-care costs. Obama 
frequently recounted personal stories about those caught in this unenviable 
situation. An emphasis on this group and others already in the insurance 
market was also evident during the president’s September 2009 address to 
Congress, during which he said: “Th e problem that plagues the health-care 
system is not just a problem of the uninsured. Th ose who do have insurance 
have never had less security and stability than they do today.” Obama pledged 
a strong and principled course of action: “We will place a limit on how much 
you can be charged for out-of-pocket expenses, because in the United States 
of America, no one should go broke because they get sick.” 76 
 A last way in which Obama deviated from Clinton’s use of the “bully 
pulpit” was the sheer  amount of talking he did on health reform. Intent on 
keeping the issue at the top of the political agenda and communicating 
directly with the American people, the president gave no fewer than four 
prime-time news conferences in six months, two of which featured health-
care reform. So common were these appearances that by July 2009 the 
networks balked at the inconvenient scheduling of another broadcast on the 
subject, and Fox refused outright. 77 Just weeks later, however, aft er lawmakers 
returned from summer break, the president again commanded a national 
audience when addressing a joint session of Congress on the issue of health 
care. Add to these major speaking events a miscellany of other television 
interviews, local “town hall” appearances, and public rallies, and the extensive-
ness of President Obama’s service on the rhetorical front lines becomes plain. 
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 Ezra Klein captured the larger pattern of events succinctly enough: 
“Barack Obama’s strategy to pass health-care reform seems to be based on a 
simple principle: Whatever Bill Clinton did, do the opposite.” 78 To summarize, 
 Table 1 catalogues the manifold ways in which the Obama administration 
sought to apply lessons learned from defeat of the Clinton health plan. 
 and the results: “learning history is easy; learning its 
lessons seems almost impossibly difficult” (nicolas 
bentley, british author and illustrator) 
 When the House of Representatives gave fi nal approval to the Senate health-
reform bill late in the evening of March 21, 2010, the president was watching 
from the Roosevelt Room in the White House. 79 Once the Democratic tally 
reached the pivotal 216th vote, Obama gave his Chief of Staff  a jubilant high 
fi ve. In days following there came more celebrations and expressions of exu-
berance. At the signing ceremony for the Patient Protection and Aff ordable 
Care Act, the president orated grandly: “Today we are affi  rming that essential 
truth, a truth every generation is called to rediscover for itself, that we are not 
a nation that scales back its aspirations.” 80 Yet the president’s great victory was 
an extremely precarious one. In fact, the margin of victory was so tight, and 
the level of opposition so vehement, that passage of the bill immediately gave 
birth to a counter-movement to “Repeal and Replace.” If it is true that the 
Obama presidency was reinvigorated by this success with health reform, the 
administration would need as much fortifi cation as possible to hold on to 
what it had achieved. 
 In this epic struggle, how well was the administration served by lessons 
it took from failure of the Clinton health plan? Unquestionably, the broadest 
insights were relevant and predictive: Expect a bloody battle. Half a loaf may 
be better than none. Look for allies. Complexity is a disadvantage. Health 
care sparks deeply rooted concerns about the role of government. But was the 
Clinton defeat necessary to instill this macro lens appreciation for the forces 
and stakes involved in health reform? Certainly those who advocate the use 
of history in public policy-making promise something more practical and 
nuanced as a payoff  than bromides of this caliber. As we have seen, the Obama 
administration resorted to historical analysis as a principal tool for mapping 
its route to reform, big picture and small steps, vision, strategy, and tactics all 
included. Where did this choice get the Democrats? The answers provide 
occasion for a sobering meditation on history’s elusiveness as handmaid to 
political power. 
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 Table 1.  Applying the Lessons of History 
  Bill Clinton 
(1993–94) 
 Barack Obama 
(2009–10) 






 Transparent, inclusive 
approach to policy 
formulation 
 Invited opposition attacks against 
the process of policy development 
 White House in 
charge of policy 
design 
 Congress in control 
of policy design 
 Impeded goal of quick action 
while increasing lack of cohesion 
in policy design 
 Partisanship  Bipartisanship  Much expenditure of eff ort with 
almost nothing to show for it 
 Slow, deliberative 
start to reform 
process 
 Quick action urged  A useful lesson that confl icted, 
however, with goals of congres-




 Willingness to 
compromise with 
powerful interests 
 Opposition was only partly 
diff used and key reform objectives 
were relinquished 
 Acceptance of 
legislative defeat in 
the face of strong 
opposition 
 Victory pursued at all 
costs, despite strong 
political opposition 
 Legislative victory provoked an 
electoral reprisal worse than that 




overhaul of the 
health-care system 
 Incremental change  Reform will take years to implement 
leaving important coverage and 
cost issues unaddressed 
 Prominent new 
regulatory role for 
government 
 Focus on expanding 
access 
 Cost control and aff ordability 
remain as problems key to the 
impact of reform 
 Universal coverage  Not universal 
coverage 
 Millions will remain 
uninsured even ten years down 
the road 
 Government fi lls 
coverage gaps 
 Individual mandate 
with Medicaid 
expansion 
 Conservatives did not appreciate 
the mandate while insurers con-
tinued to subvert legislation; an 
uncertain process of state-level 
implementation will be necessary 
for this model 
use, available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0898030612000024
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 00:41:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
 kevin p.  donnelly  and  david a.  rochefort  |  205 
 A false lesson may be said to describe situations in which a mistaken 
conclusion has been drawn about changing outcomes on one side of the equation 
by altering inputs on the other. Or, to put it more simply, it is the perception 
of an opportunity for achieving a diff erent set of results in the future where 
none exists. Surely one such false lesson was seen in the administration’s attempt 
to mute criticism of its policy-making process on health reform by commit-
ting to transparency. Loath to repeat Clinton’s secretive process of policy 
development, the Obama administration allowed congressional backdoor 
dealing—a common but rarely spotlighted feature of the legislative process—
to play out in front of a national audience, providing Republicans with prime 
fodder for opposition attacks. In two particularly poignant examples, Senator 
Ben Nelson, a centrist Democrat from Nebraska, secured federal funding for 
100 percent of his state’s Medicaid expansion in return, allegedly, for his 
support of the health-reform law, while another holdout, Democrat Senator 
Mary Landrieu from Louisiana, apparently gained roughly $100–300 million 
in additional Medicaid funding for her state in return for a “yes” vote. 81 
 Reform opponents seized on these deals, known pejoratively as the 
“Cornhusker Kickback” and “Louisiana Purchase,” to label craft ing of the health 
Table 1. Continued
  Bill Clinton 
(1993–94) 
 Barack Obama 
(2009–10) 
 Lesson Evaluation 
 Political 
Rhetoric 
 Highly technical 
language 
 Broad statement of 
principles 
 Provided lawmakers with only 
limited direction 
 Insurance industry 
defi ned as source 
of the problem 
 Reluctance to vilify 
insurance industry 
 Strategy ultimately had to be 
jettisoned during legislative end 
game 





 Public failed to understand much 
of the law, despite eff orts to 
“educate” 
 Primary focus on 
the uninsured 
 Primary focus on 
those insured but 
“at risk” 
 Probably a good choice, although 
little evidence of public response 
once “attack phase” against 




 Frequent presidential 
communication 
 Probably a good choice, although 
little evidence of public response 
once “attack phase” against 
proposal was under way 
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law as corrupt “politics as usual,” stirring outrage among Tea Party activists 
and others who feared the federal government was not serving their best 
interests in this process. Even Republican Governor Dave Heineman of Nebraska, 
whose state would have gained considerably from the Nelson “kickback,” 
denounced it as a “special deal, rather than a fair deal.” 82 In response to a 
groundswell of critical media attention, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid 
said matter-of-factly: “You’ll fi nd a number of states that are treated diff er-
ently than other states. Th at’s what legislating is all about. It’s compromise.” 83 
True enough, but drawing public attention to such unequal treatment did 
little to cultivate public support for reform. Th is is certainly not to suggest 
that a repeat of Clinton’s highly closed process of policy formulation would 
have been wise political strategy either, only that President Obama gained 
little by swinging to the opposite extreme based on his interpretation of policy 
history. Th e president’s commitment to the bright glare of legislative sunshine 
opened up both the politics and policy substance of health reform to harsh 
criticism, even ridicule. None other than John McCain attempted to embarrass 
the president at the Blair House summit by complaining: “What we got was a 
process that you and I both said we would change in Washington.” To which 
the president could only reply tiredly: “We’re not campaigning any more. Th e 
election is over.” 84 
 Even when historical lessons are not false, they may confl ict. Reviewing 
the crash and burn of Clinton’s health reform, a score of health policy experts 
and pundits had stressed the necessity of moving quickly  and involving 
Congress in policy formulation. Th e Obama administration accepted both 
insights as well founded and wise, but it was not really possible to do both 
things. Th e inevitability of this trade-off  between quick action and congressional 
control of the policy-making process is not adequately addressed in the 
postreform scholarly literature. In his June 2010 article published in  Health 
Aff airs , James Morone writes approvingly that Obama “urged speed at every 
opportunity” and “repeatedly set deadlines for Congress.” 85 Yet, as Morone 
also notes, no matter how much the president urged Congress to move, the 
lawmaking branch adhered to its own sluggish pace toward reform. Simply 
stated, Congress is designed to move slowly. Not only must there be agreement 
between House and Senate—representative bodies with very diff erent legislative 
priorities and electoral pressures—but ever lurking at the end of the work of 
committees and subcommittees in 2010 was a fi libuster possibility in the 
Senate. In a way markedly worse than the period of the Clinton health plan, 
the U.S. Congress of 2009–10 found its legislating hampered constantly by 
fi libuster or a threat of fi libuster, both of which had become easier due to 
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changes in institutional rules and procedures over the years. 86 Nor did 
Democrat leaders in Congress appear overly moved by the president’s urging 
for prompt deliverance of a bill. When asked in November whether the Senate 
would meet the president’s end-of-year deadline for passing health-care 
reform, Senator Reid struck a pose of independence, informing reporters that 
“we’re not going to be bound by any timelines.” 87 Th us, although the process 
of health reform may have benefi ted from an early kickoff  in March 2009, 
Congress was unable (or unwilling) to meet the president’s rapid legislative 
timetable, and it was oft en hard to gauge how much Obama’s attempts to 
impose deadlines really mattered. 
 One main legislative holdup was the Senate Finance Committee, where 
months of wrangling over issues like the public option and cost and fi nancing 
kept the bill bottled up until mid-October. In this instance, it was the president’s 
goal of bipartisan compromise that came into confl ict with his eff ort to move 
reform quickly through Congress. Former Senator Tom Daschle published a 
glowing appraisal of Obama’s political strategy in the wake of passage of the 
health-care law: “All of the White House strategies for health care reform 
were smart ones, with plenty of good reasoning to back them up.” 88 He added, 
however, that “these plans also created their own problems.” Among them, 
the decision to allow the Senate Finance Committee time to forge a bipartisan 
consensus, though a “worthy goal that had a brief chance of success . . . went 
on too long and allowed opponents to mobilize, just as they did with the 
Clinton health care plan.” 89 Admitting that the administration did not have 
the benefit of hindsight, as we now have, Daschle argued all the same that 
“a timely change in strategy might have headed off  some of the later events 
that nearly killed health care reform.” 
 Th e most signifi cant of these “later events” arose directly from the prolonged 
legislative dance, as Daschle rightly observed. Reform opponents used time 
as a resource to strengthen the movement against health-care reform. Th e 
fruits of this eff ort surfaced in dramatic fashion in the summer of 2009 as 
members of the House and Senate returned home to their districts only to 
fi nd themselves in the center of raucous town-hall meetings. National news 
networks were not slow to broadcast legislators’ wide-eyed response to 
crowds of outraged citizens. On August 3, Katie Couric adopted an ominous 
tone in describing the building momentum of negation: “Voices are being heard 
all over the country, voices of protest and they’re growing louder.” 90 This 
narrative, which played out for several weeks, continued until the reconvening 
of Congress in September, and it allowed opponents to portray lawmakers 
who remained committed to reform as dismissive of the concerns of their 
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constituents. As this pressure intensified into the winter months, some 
Democrat lawmakers lashed out, imploring the president to intervene. In just 
one example, Florida Senator Bill Nelson, during a meeting between David 
Axelrod and congressional Democrats, delivered a vehement message to the 
administration: “There’s a great deal of frustration that the president isn’t 
getting the feelings that a lot of us are feeling. Th e president needs to be more 
hands-on with the health-care bill.” 91 Eventually, the president did assume 
more leadership in fi nalizing legislation, and his strategy of allowing Congress 
to work out the details of reform did help to shore up buy-in among Democrats, 
an advantage that Clinton lacked. Still, Obama’s long reluctance to play a 
dominant role had incurred a steep political cost. 
 Another downside of this same strategy lies in the design of the health-
care law. Refl ecting an unrestrained and highly contentious legislative process, 
the reform became a messy culmination of compromises, concessions, and 
last-minute alterations. Moreover, the fi nal law, which lacks both a public 
insurance option and a centralized purchasing hub, relies on each state to 
create its own “exchange” devices, while aff ording a great deal of autonomy to 
subnational actors in regard to fi nal policy design and operationalization. 
Such lack of cohesion could present important unforeseen consequences, not 
least the addition of another costly and inequitable layer to the complex 
“patchwork” of American health care. Could not this risk have been better 
managed with more forceful policy direction from the White House? How 
telling it seems that the following critical assessments, fi rst from Tea Party 
activist Dick Armey and second from Ralph Nader, two fi gures whose political 
philosophies are as diff erent as diff erent can be, so closely echo each other:
 Th e real winners are insurance companies and big pharma. Americans 
want health care reform that improves access to health care through 
reforms that hold down costs. Instead they got a trillion dollar bill 
that was more politics than good policy. 
 Th e health insurance legislation is a major political symbol wrapped 
around a shredded substance. It does not provide coverage that is 
universal, comprehensive or aff ordable. It is a remnant even of its 
own initially compromised self—bereft of any public option, any 
safeguard for states desiring a single payer approach, any adequate 
antitrust protections, any shift  of power toward consumers to defend 
themselves, any regulation of insurance prices, any authority for 
Uncle Sam to bargain with drug companies, and any reimportation 
of lower-priced drugs. 92 
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 To a great extent, the Obama administration’s broadly defi ned “principles” 
left the substance of reform in the hands not only of Congress but also 
implementing offi  cials, a chancy bet in this period of political backlash 
against the bill. It does not equate to aimless hankering aft er the Canadian 
plan, or some other foreign version of national health insurance, to point out 
the limitations of a reform that will leave five to ten million Americans 
without coverage even aft er full implementation ten years down the road; the 
numbers rise even higher if one counts those moving into and out of this 
precarious position over a defi ned interval of time. 
 In a diff erent take, Morone has argued that those who claim Obama 
“overlearned” this Clintonian lesson of deference to legislative prerogative 
suff er from “naiveté” about the congressional process. 93 However, Morone 
does agree that a president can potentially fall victim to two mistakes: “Too 
hard a line and a president cannot round up the needed votes; too soft  and the 
legislation becomes so attenuated that it fails to serve its purpose.” 94 So, did 
Obama make the right choice when faced with this dilemma? Concedes 
Morone: “Here there is room for disagreement,” and “We’ll discover, in the 
years ahead, whether President Obama made the second mistake.” 
 As noted, the Obama administration also sought to bridge the deep 
political divides that had plagued Clinton’s reform effort. Application of 
this historical lesson took the form of a two-pronged strategy: a commitment 
to working across party lines to gain Republican support, and an outreach 
to industry stakeholders. On the fi rst score, the Obama administration failed 
miserably at gaining Republican support for the process of health reform. 
Five committees were involved in producing health legislation: Education, 
Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means in the House; Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions, and Finance in the Senate. Considering the actions 
of all fi ve committees, only a single Republican voted with the Democrats, 
Finance Committee member Olympia Snowe of Maine. What Snowe contrib-
uted to the cause of health reform, she gave grudgingly. “Is this bill all that 
I would want? Far from it,” she explained. “But when history calls, history 
calls. And I happen to think that the consequences of inaction dictate the 
urgency of Congress to take every opportunity to demonstrate its capacity to 
solve the monumental issues of our time. . . . My vote today is my vote today. 
It doesn’t forecast what my vote will be tomorrow.” 95 When the House passed 
its composite bill in November, again only one Republican, Louisiana freshman 
Anh Cao, supported it. 96 Neither a subsequent vote by the full Senate in 
December nor the fi nal House vote in March counted any Republicans among 
the ayes. 
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 Events at Blair House in March 2010 punctuated forcefully the Republican 
stance of noncooperation during this long year of health-reform politics. In 
an interview on CBS prior to broadcast of the Superbowl, the president 
stated: “I want to come back and have a large meeting, Republicans and 
Democrats, to go through systematically all the best ideas that are out there 
and move it forward.” 97 At best, Obama hoped to fi nd some concrete area of 
compromise to attract a few votes across party lines. At worst, the president 
expected Republicans might demonstrate their contrariness before a national 
television audience. The president got the latter, as one Republican after 
another at the gathering repeated the mantra: Scrap the bill! We need to start 
over! 98 
 As political theater, the performances were pretty good, but it suff ered 
from a dismal lack of originality. Here was a stale script merely being acted 
out with new characters and staging. Describing Newt Gingrich’s reaction when 
President Clinton had launched his health-reform plan before Congress in 
1993, Johnson and Broder revealed that the House Minority Whip was lying 
in wait: “[For nearly two and a half years], Gingrich prepared to defeat the 
very kind of plan now being proposed. No support would come from Gingrich 
and the restive Republicans he led, especially support for a President of Gingrich’s 
own post–World War II generation who possessed, Gingrich believed, 
formidable political gift s with potential for becoming another FDR. . . . House 
Democrats knew they could not expect a single Republican vote. Th ey would 
have to win this by themselves.” 99 Similarly, in 2009–10, the Republicans saw 
no political gain in helping the president. Conservative commentator David 
Frum explained: “At the beginning of this process we made a strategic decision: 
unlike, say, Democrats in 2001 when President Bush proposed his fi rst tax 
cut, we would make no deal with the administration. No negotiations, no 
compromise, nothing. We were going for all the marbles. This would be 
Obama’s Waterloo—just as healthcare was Clinton’s in 1994.” 100 
 Was it arrogance or naiveté for the Obama administration to imagine that 
this stark pattern of partisanship could be reversed once health reform returned 
to the national agenda? No matter. It amounted to a wishful  mis reading of the 
historical record and present circumstances, one costly in time and resources, 
to judge that a modifi ed approach by Democrats could secure a bipartisan 
path to health reform. Even if Democrats had been willing to do the unthinkable 
and reach across the aisle to embrace a Republican plan for health reform, it 
could not have worked. Th ere  was no proposal from the Republican leadership 
before November 2009. 101 When it fi nally appeared, the GOP plan seemed 
but an empty political gesture, offering neither substantial expansion of 
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coverage nor protections for those already having insurance, sine qua nons of 
reform for most Democratic rank and fi le. 
 In the search for common ground with opponents, the president and 
Democrats in Congress gave up a lot on policy design. Judged by the standard 
of nations around the world having comprehensive health care that marries 
universality with spending controls, the best one could label this nascent 
American program was “health-reform lite.” Even compared to the Clinton 
plan, Obama set his sights low. Opting to build on the existing system—in 
fact, a strengthened private insurance market without insistent competitive 
pressures—the president settled for less than universal coverage while skirting 
the establishment of strong cost-containment mechanisms. Th e individual 
mandate, an idea with strong conservative bona fi des going back to the 
1990s, 102 was identifi ed with Mitt Romney’s breakthrough health-care legislation 
in Massachusetts. But Mitt Romney would have none of it now, claiming a 
mandate was sound public policy on the state level but unacceptable as 
federal law. All told, as  Newsweek editor Jon Meacham said on  Meet the Press, 
the Democratic health bill came out “somewhat to the right” of where Richard 
Nixon stood on health reform in the early 1970s. 103 Ezra Klein has described 
it as “a dead-ringer for the bill Republicans rallied around as a conservative 
alternative to the big-government overreach of ClintonCare.” 104 
 Still, the Republicans pilloried the Democrats’ approach in 2010 as a 
“government takeover” of the private health system. During the fi nal House 
debate, Republican Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee mourned the “death of 
freedom” under health reform, while Republican John Shadegg of Arizona 
warned: “Tragically, this bill will . . . do incredible damage to the very fabric 
of our society.” More extreme comments by Republican Devin Nunes of 
California are worth quoting at length: “For most of the twentieth century, 
people fl ed the ghosts of Communist dictators. Now, you are bringing the 
ghosts back into this chamber. With passage of this bill, they will haunt 
Americans for generations. . . .Today, Democrats in this House will fi nally lay 
the cornerstone of their socialist utopia on the backs of the American 
people.” 105 
 Had President Obama bused a group of Canadian bureaucrats to the 
United States to perform a transplant operation installing a full-blown single-
payer system, denouncements from the right could hardly have been more 
excessive. Signifi cantly, aft er passage of the health-reform law, the  New York 
Times speculated whether it represented a “grand achievement, or a lost 
opportunity” for creating a stronger government presence within the insurance 
system. 106 
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 Somehow the insurance industry also convinced the Obama administration 
that it was a leopard that had changed its spots. Th e AHIP’s stated willingness 
to support reform this time around was a main reason why the president 
adopted the individual mandate and also why Obama did not push harder for 
a public insurance option, despite his own preference for this provision. In a 
preliminary appraisal of the Obama health-reform law, Lawrence Jacobs and 
Th eda Skocpol have argued that getting into bed with the insurers and other 
powerful interests was a necessary step, central to the administration’s success 
because it prevented “the full force of all-out, unifi ed business opposition” 
such as the kind that derailed the Clinton plan. 107 But insurers had undergone 
no political conversion since the early 1990s; they had only gotten craft ier. 
Even while speaking publicly in favor of reform, they maneuvered behind the 
scenes to help kill or dramatically reshape legislation. According to a report 
on health-reform lobbying activities by the  National Journal , AHIP funneled 
between $10 million and $20 million from a group of the nation’s largest 
insurers to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to fi nance attack ads against bills 
moving through Congress during the summer of 2009. 108 Th e experience of 
1993–94 had taught that the insurance industry was a formidable foe in the 
quest for health reform. But was the right lesson to placate the enemy or to 
take heed and gird for war? It’s the kind of dilemma that historical awareness 
can do much to illuminate but little to answer. Th e Obama team opted for the 
former approach only to be sorely disappointed. 
 Historical analysis can be most frustrating when the lessons it provides 
are sound and even obvious, yet there is no effective means of capitalizing 
on them. Understanding how the American public had withdrawn support 
from health reform in the early 1990s, the Obama team knew it would be 
detrimental to let voters become confused or alienated again. Th e White 
House website was used in creative ways to advance the president’s agenda 
on this issue by making available speeches and policy briefi ngs, posting 
videos of “average Americans” dealing with health insurance problems, and 
more. It also linked to the site “HealthReform.Gov,” which presented a 
wealth of constantly updated information, web chats, and interactive Q&A 
features. Nothing comparable was, or could have been, done by the Clinton 
administration in the early 1990s simply because technology for such a mass 
communication project did not exist. As we have seen, President Obama 
himself also made public outreach a top priority. His team sent him out 
frequently to explain the need for and objectives of reform, as well as the 
administration’s recommended remedies. If Americans did not comprehend 
the concept of health reform, it was not for the administration’s lack of trying. 
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Yet misunderstand it they did.  Newsweek conducted a national poll in 
mid-February 2010 that was revealing. 109 It found that while most Americans 
said they were against “Obama’s health care reform plan,” a majority backed 
specifi c provisions of the Democratic proposal when these were outlined to 
them. This paradox was consistent with turbulent Town Hall meetings 
during late summer of 2009 in which one witnessed such oddities as elderly 
citizens protesting: “Keep government hands off my Medicare!” 110 In the 
end, Democrats had to move legislation forward without benefi t of strong 
public support. Passage did not mean the challenge of winning over the 
public had ended, only that it now shift ed to the troubled implementation 
stage for this new law. 
 So it was that the Obama team tried to learn from health-reform history 
and did so thoroughly and self-consciously. Almost in the manner of diligent 
students from May and Neustadt’s Harvard classroom, the policymakers 
moved forward on the basis of clear problem defi nition and policy objectives, 
exhaustive fact gathering, broad-based input, and well-informed recognition 
of key stakeholders and actors. Th e advice received came from some of the 
top students of health policymaking in America. And, as a result of this 
methodical process, key lessons were drawn, many of which led nowhere, 
backfi red, or proved tangential. Nonetheless, when all is said and done, the 
Obama administration did walk away victory in hand. How did it happen? 
 The nadir of the conflict over health reform came for Democrats in 
January 2010, when Republican Scott Brown snatched Ted Kennedy’s Senate 
seat in a special election. 111 Brown had campaigned against the legislation 
moving through Congress. Aside from embarrassing the Democrats while 
raising the specter of massive losses in the forthcoming midterm elections, 
his victory meant the majority party had lost its fi libuster-proof margin in the 
Senate. At the same time, the administration was contending with revolts by 
pro-life advocates, who feared expanded public fi nancing for abortion, and 
liberals, who insisted on a government-run plan as part of the framework of 
insurance market changes. (Independent Senator Joseph Lieberman had just 
succeeded in pressuring the Democratic leadership to drop a provision allowing 
Americans fifty-five and older to buy into Medicare.) 112 The president 
retreated, weighing the possibilities for a much weaker, more bipartisan, 
legislative package. At his State of the Union address, Obama provoked 
laughter when he said that “by now it should be fairly obvious that I didn’t 
take on health care because it was good politics.” 113 
 Announcement of the Blair House summit signaled a last-gasp eff ort at 
working with Republicans on health care. For the administration, however, 
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the meeting’s failure would not mean an abandonment of reform. Instead, it 
set the stage for a dramatic end game in which the cautious political approach 
of the past year would be set aside. By now, Democrats had already stopped 
coddling insurers, and they lashed out when Anthem Blue Cross in California 
requested skyrocketing premium increases. Accusing the industry of pursuing 
“big profi ts” at the expense of consumer hardship, the president adopted a 
tough new rhetorical approach. 114 He also called attention repeatedly to the 
heartbreaking story of one Ohio woman who was a cancer survivor and no 
longer able to aff ord her health coverage. 115 Hardball had fi nally begun. Th is 
dramatic change in strategy represents an outright rejection of a key lesson of 
history. Th e administration’s cautious use of rhetoric, steadfastly adhered to 
for over a year, was replaced by fi ery language, partisan attacks, emotional 
stories, and a demonizing of the insurance industry. It was this strategic 
conversion that injected much-needed momentum into the fi nal push toward 
reform. 
 Among the many lessons of 1993–94, there was evidently one more that 
President Obama took to heart: Failure is not an option. Here was a meta 
insight that became controlling. Following Blair House, the Democrats 
moved into high gear. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi marshaled support for the 
Senate health bill, combining upbeat encouragement of her colleagues with 
an ability to be “scary tough.” 116 Meanwhile, President Obama did what he 
could to shore up political vulnerabilities. He cut a deal with leaders of the 
pro-life forces in Congress, agreeing to a special Executive Order confi rming 
that taxpayer money would not pay for abortions. 117 He also mollifi ed single-
payer critics, transporting Representative Dennis Kucinich via Air Force One 
to a rally in his home district in Ohio. 118 
 Last, the president and Democratic lawmakers decided to use the 
budgetary procedure known as “reconciliation” to force their health bill 
through Congress with a simple majority. Republicans cried “Foul!” and it 
was unknown how the American public would view this legislative maneuvering. 
But there was no turning back at this point. Interestingly, the administration 
laid the groundwork for this unusual step in April, and it also grew out of a 
lesson learned from the Clinton experience. 119 Chief of Staff Emanuel 
convinced members of the Senate Budget Committee to insert a provision in 
the budget document allowing reconciliation procedures for health and 
education measures reducing the deficit. Emanuel had been part of the 
Clinton team that tried and failed to take advantage of a similar tactic in 
1993–94. Yet, as so oft en seems the case with lesson drawing, events unfolded 
in a way diff erent from expected. Although the administration anticipated 
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the reconciliation process might be needed to overcome a fi libuster in the 
Senate, it was in the House where reconciliation proved crucial in giving 
Democrats the means to pass changes to the Senate-approved health measure 
by majority vote on a separate bill. 
 Th e president’s victory almost instantly inspired its own new round of 
lesson drawing.  New York Times reporter Sheryl Gay Stolberg off ered these 
observations: “Among the many lessons Democrats have learned from President 
Obama’s 14-month slog through the nation’s vitriolic health care debate is that 
there are two ways for a president to do business in hyperpartisan Washington. 
One is to go small, and partner across the aisle. Th e other is to go big, and go 
it alone. Mr. Obama chose the second path on health care—and came out on 
top.” 120 Th e irony was inescapable. For “going it alone” and “going big” were 
nothing if not antithetical to the most basic historical lessons drawn from 
defeat of the Clinton health plan. 
 All of which brings us to the 2010 midterm elections, in which Democrats 
took a “shellacking,” as the president himself described it. 121 Obama’s party 
lost more than sixty seats in the House, along with control of the chamber, 
and six seats in the Senate, an electoral rout even worse than the “Republican 
Revolution” of 1994. In the wake of this dramatic reversal of fortune, was 
the victory-at-all-cost approach to health reform a valuable learned-lesson? 
Skocpol had written about 1994 that “many voters were punishing Democrats 
for having been in charge during a time when Washington was ‘a mess’ and 
not delivering desired results.” 122 If true, there could be no doubt about what 
Democrats needed to accomplish if ever given the chance for a do-over. How-
ever, far from insulating the Democrats from electoral fallout, the passage of 
health legislation in 2010 actually provoked reprisal from voters. 
 A public opinion study by Robert Blendon and John Benson in the 
lead-up to the midterm elections found that, in fact, the health-reform 
law sat heavily enough on the minds of voters to make a difference. More 
than four in ten Americans said that health care or health-care reform 
would be an “extremely important” voting issue for them, second only 
to the economy. Further, more than seven in ten respondents said that 
“a candidate’s position on the health care law [would] play a role in their 
congressional vote.” 123 Most Democrats (67 percent) said they were more 
likely to vote for a congressional candidate who supported the new health-
care law, but 72 percent of Republicans said they were less likely. Perhaps 
most important, 37 percent of Independents were less likely to vote for a 
candidate who supported the health-care law and only 29 percent were 
more likely to vote for such a candidate. 124 
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 A Kaiser Family Foundation Poll conducted shortly aft er the election 
confi rmed the role of health reform in voter decision making. When asked 
about the top factors that had infl uenced their vote, 17 percent of respondents 
named health care/health-care reform as the most important. Th is ranked 
fourth behind those who identifi ed jobs and the economy (29 percent), party 
preference (25 percent), and views of the candidates themselves (21 percent) 
as the most infl uential factors. Among the 17 percent of “health-care voters,” 
however, nearly six in ten (59 percent) backed a Republican candidate for 
Congress, and 56 percent had a “very unfavorable view” of the new health-
care law. Nearly half of these voters (49 percent) reported being angry about 
the law, 45 percent wanted repeal of the entire law, and another 26 percent 
called for parts of the law to be repealed. 125 
 Even President Obama, in a postelection press conference, hinted that 
the health-reform “process” contributed to his party’s major losses. Respond-
ing to a reporter who asked about the deal-making, the president admitted: 
“But you are absolutely right that when you are navigating through a 
House and a Senate in this kind of pretty partisan environment that it’s 
an ugly mess when it comes to process. And I think that is something that 
really affected how people viewed the outcome. That is something that 
I regret—that we couldn’t have made the process more—healthier than it 
ended up being.” 126 
 In a way that lesson drawing about the Clinton years could not antici-
pate, the 2010 midterm elections also complicated the future of health reform 
as policy reality. On Election Day, an unquestionably concerned Obama 
implored supporters to head to the polls by suggesting that his agenda was 
“all at risk if people don’t turn out and vote today.” 127 Th is dire statement raises 
the question: Just how much of the president’s accomplishment is now in 
jeopardy? Reveling in victory, Republican House Speaker-elect John Boehner 
off ered a glimpse of things to come when he announced in no uncertain 
terms that “the healthcare bill that was enacted by the current Congress 
will kill jobs in America, ruin the best healthcare system in the world, and 
bankrupt our country. Th at means we have to do everything we can to try to 
repeal this bill and replace it with common sense reforms to bring down the 
cost of health care.” 128 Although it will be impossible to repeal the law while 
Obama occupies the Oval Offi  ce, Boehner’s statement is by no means an 
empty threat. Just days aft er the election, the  New York Times reported that 
Republicans “hoped to use the power of the purse to challenge main elements 
of the law, forcing Democrats—especially those in the Senate who will be 
up for re-election in 2012—into a series of votes to defend it.” 129 Among 
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other tactics, Republicans plan to limit money for the Internal Revenue 
Service so that the agency will be hard pressed to enforce the health-care 
mandate, and to use spending bills to block federal insurance regulations 
to which they are opposed. 130 Th e courts will provide another institutional 
battleground for those intent on challenging the legality of the health law, 
with outcomes of these cases hard to foresee. And, as a result of the 2010 
election, Republicans gained the majority of governorships across the 
country. Many prominent conservative officeholders vowed to do every-
thing within their power to block implementation of the law, 131 while fi g-
ures such as Tim Pawlenty of Minnesota and Rick Perry of Texas made 
the issue a cornerstone in their bid for the 2012 Republican presidential 
nomination. 
 conclusion 
 Whatever might come next, the American health-care system stands forever 
changed by adoption of the Patient Protection and Aff ordable Care Act of 
2010. President Obama deserves credit for achieving a legislative feat that 
consistently eluded his predecessors and doing so under treacherous political 
conditions. Expansions of coverage have already begun to benefi t millions of 
Americans. Yet, for all the reasons noted here, the role and impact of historical 
lessons in this legislative episode are intricate matters to discern. It is far 
from clear to what extent such lesson drawing was responsible for the 
administration’s success in moving its health proposal into law. Moreover, 
tough questions need to be asked about the character of health-policy reform 
that those lessons helped to inspire. 
 On the issue of health care, Barack Obama entered the White House 
aiming to prove that history need not repeat itself. Striving to avoid the 
kind of costly defeat suff ered by Bill Clinton, the president and his advisers 
put faith in learning from the past. The outcomes were mixed at best and 
demonstrated the perverse difficulty of putting into practice the advice of 
those who counsel historical awareness as a guide within the policy-making 
process. While providing a sense of direction and initial confi dence among the 
reformers, the lessons of 1993–94 did not always pay dividends and sometimes 
even blinded the administration to traps and opportunities within pre-
sent circumstances. And when push fi nally came to shove, the Obama team 
needed to look beyond historical lessons in reviving their moribund cause. 
For the president and his allies, it was probably inevitable that the challenge 
of leadership would take them to a juncture where the established playbook 
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gave way to the dangerous political adventure of inventing what could be. 
Because this, too, is written in the pages of history. 
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